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I. INTRODUCTION

Improving the quality of care and quality of life for individuals with
advanced, irreversible illness is a paramount goal from the perspectives of
both ethics and public health. One aspect of achieving such improvement
entails assuring that the care those individuals receive is consistent with their
important, authentic, personal values and wishes.1 The physician and other
professional members of the health care team are the experts on medical
*

Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H., Director, Florida State University Center for
Innovative Collaboration in Medicine & Law, Tallahassee, FL
1
This proposition is based on the fundamental ethical principle of autonomy.
See Kathy L. Cerminara, The Law and Its Interaction With Medical Ethics in End-of-Life
Decision Making, 140 CHEST 775 (2011); Deborah L. Volker & Hung-Lan Wu, Cancer
Patients’ Preferences for Control at the End of Life, 21 QUALITY HEALTH RESOL. 1618 (2011)
(examining the widely-shared value of patient autonomy in American culture). But see
Gentian Vyshka & Jera Kruja, Inapplicability of Advance Directives in a Paternalistic Setting:
The Case of a Post-Communist Health System, 12 BMC MED. ETHICS 12 (2011) (observing
that patient autonomy is treated as a pernicious value in totalitarian regimes).
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means to achieve specific outcomes, but the individual patient is the best
expert about his or her own values, goals, and preferences.2 The quality of
care and quality of life challenge is exacerbated by the fact that, as the
medical and social ramifications of advanced illness unfold over time, many
people receive care within several different settings, often moving back and
forth among settings as their immediate needs and resources change.
Consequently, it is imperative that the mechanisms we develop for the
purpose of enforcing persons’ personal care values and preferences follow
individuals across and throughout the care continuum.
Many people with advanced, irreversible illness reach a point at
which they need to receive most of their care in a nursing home,3 and a large
proportion of those individuals ultimately die in that venue4 after receiving
various forms of medical care there.5 The care actually provided to nursing
home residents during the period prior to their deaths too frequently deviates
from that which they, on the basis of their own values, really want.6 This
article discusses one initiative—the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment (POLST) paradigm—that holds the promise of improving the
quality of care and quality of life for nursing home residents with advanced,
irreversible illness by more closely reconciling the details of the actual care
they receive at the most crucial juncture of their lives with their desired care
in that context.
The next section of this article provides background on the
intersection of nursing homes and the care of people with advanced,
2
J. Andrew Billings & Eric L. Krakauer, On Patient Autonomy and Physician
Responsibility in End-of-Life Care, 171 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 849 (2011).
3
See, e.g., Mary E. Dellefield & Rebecca Ferrini, Promoting Excellence in Endof-Life Care: Lessons Learned From a Cohort of Nursing Home Residents With Advanced
Huntington Disease, 43 J. NEUROSCI. NURSING 186 (2011) (explaining that many people with
advanced Huntington Disease need to be cared for in a nursing home setting).
4
E.g., Steven C. Zweig et al., The Physician’s Role in Patients’ Nursing Home
Care, 306 JAMA 1468, 1475 (2011) (indicating that 30% of Americans will die in nursing
homes); Susan L. Mitchell et al., A National Study of the Location of Death for Older Persons
With Dementia, 53 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 299 (2005).
5
Anita Bercovitz et al., End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes: 2004 National
Nursing Home Survey, NAT’L. No. 9 HEALTH STATISTICS REP. (Oct. 8, 2008).
6
See, e.g., Lauren W. Cohen et al., Family Perceptions of End-of-Life Care for
Long-Term Care Residents with Dementia: Differences Between the United States and the
Netherlands, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 316 (2012) (noting inappropriate treatment of
nursing home residents with dementia). The present article focuses solely on the nursing home
context. The problem of medical interventions deviating from patients’ wishes in other health
care settings has been discussed extensively elsewhere and is beyond the present scope of
concern. See, e.g., John J. Mitchell, Jr., The Findings of the Dartmouth Atlas Project: A
Challenge to Clinical and Ethical Excellence in End-of-Life Care, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 267
(2011) (finding huge variations in the quantity and quality of medical care provided to
critically ill Medicare beneficiaries across the United States, with the main determinant being
the supply of services available in a particular geographic area); Jacqueline K. Yuen et al.,
Hospital Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders: Why They Have Failed and How to Fix Them, 26 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 791 (2011) (documenting that many cardiopulmonary resuscitation
attempts in hospitals would not have been desired by the patients involved).
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irreversible illness. First, it outlines the importance of nursing homes within
the contemporary American health care enterprise and then describes the
ways in which medical care decisions are made today in this context and
identifies some of the major shortcomings of the status quo.7 The ensuing
section proposes the POLST paradigm as a viable alternative to the status
quo, laying a foundation by setting forth information on the nomenclature,
definition, and legal status of the POLST concept and then specifically
exploring the adaptability of the POLST paradigm to the nursing home
setting. The advantages of this mechanism as compared with conventional
Advance Directives (ADs) are highlighted. The article concludes that
POLST can and should be an integral facet of ideal nursing home care for all
willing and appropriate residents.
II. NURSING HOMES AND THE CARE OF RESIDENTS WITH
ADVANCED, IRREVERSIBLE ILLNESS
A. Nursing Homes in the Contemporary American Health Care Enterprise
Although tremendous strides have been made in recent years in
shifting much of the care of older disabled people away from institutions and
toward home and community-based environments,8 and that rebalancing was
modestly further incentivized by the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA),9
nursing homes nonetheless remain an important and inevitable component of
the present and future American health care enterprise.10 Several factors

7
The present article concentrates exclusively on nursing homes in the United
States, but it is noteworthy that many of the same issues also arise in nursing homes in other
countries. See, e.g., Elisabeth Gjerberg et al., Ethical Challenges in the Provision of End-ofLife Care in Norwegian Nursing Homes, 71 SOC. SCI. MED. 677 (2010).
8
See H. Stephen Kaye, Gradual Rebalancing of Medicaid Long-Term Care
Services and Supports Saves Money and Serves More People, Statistical Model Shows, 31
HEALTH AFF. 1195, 1198 (2012); Donald L. Redfoot & Ari Houser, More Older People With
Disabilities Living in the Community: Trends From the National Long-Term Care Survey,
1984–2004, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 2010); David C. Grabowski et al., Supporting
Home- and Community-Based Care: Views of Long-Term Care Specialists, 67 MED. CARE
RES. & REV. 82S (2010).
9
Charlene Harrington et al., Medicaid Home- and Community-Based Services:
Impact of the Affordable Care Act, 24 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 169 (2012). The Affordable
Care Act (ACA), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), was upheld in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
10
Mitchell H. Katz, There’s No Place Like Home, 171 ARCH. INTERNAL MED.
804, 804 (2011); NOELLE DENNY-BROWN ET AL., MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON
DEMONSTRATION: OVERVIEW OF STATE GRANTEE PROGRESS, JANUARY TO JUNE, 2011 xii
(Mathematica
Policy
Research
2011),
available
at
www.mathematicampr.com/publications/pdfs/health/mfp_jan-jun2011_progress.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2013)
(reporting a significant rate of temporary or permanent reinstitutionalization of previous
nursing home residents back from community settings); Nancy A. Miller et al., A Profile of
Middle-Aged and Older Adults Admitted to Nursing Homes: 2000-2008, 24 J. AGING & SOC.
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place individuals at increased risk for nursing home admission, such as
problems with independently carrying out multiple activities of daily living
(ADLs), cognitive impairment, and prior nursing home use.11 Currently,
there are approximately 15,600 federally certified nursing homes (skilled
nursing facilities (SNFs) or nursing facilities (NFs)) operating in the United
States,12 with slightly more than 1.6 million certified beds and approximately
1.4 million residents on any given night.13
An older person’s likelihood of living in a nursing home
increases sharply with age. The share institutionalized
remained [during 2006–2008] extremely low from ages 65–
69 (1.0%) and ages 75–79 (3.0%), then began to rise
markedly, reaching 11.2% at ages 85–89, 19.8% at ages 90–
94, 31.0% at ages 95–99, and 38.2% at 100 years of age and
older.14
Beyond the demographics, the financial impact of nursing homes on
the American economy is significant.15 Nursing home care commands major
state and federal expenditures by Medicaid programs and out-of-pocket
expenditures by residents and their families, with private long-term care
insurance, Medicare, and private philanthropy playing important but much
smaller financial roles.16 Of particular interest to the states: “[n]ursing home
coverage is the fastest growing area of Medicaid coverage, and is likely to

POL’Y 271, 272 (2012) (noting that middle-aged adults with chronic medical and psychiatric
problems are becoming an increasing share of the nursing home population).
11
Joseph E. Gaugler et al., Predicting Nursing Home Admission in the U.S.: A
Meta-Analysis, 7 BMC GERIATRICS 13 (2007).
12
American Health Care Association, Reimbursement and Research Department,
Trends in Nursing Facility Characteristics 3 (2011), available at www.ahcancal.org/
research_data/trends_statistics/documents/trend_PVNF_Finalrpt_december.pdf. (last visited
Mar. 6, 2013). These data are derived from the CMS Online Survey and Certification
Reporting (OSCAR) data network. Id.
13
Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1475 (indicating that 30% of Americans will die
in nursing homes).
14
Wan He & Mark N. Muenchrath, 90+ in the United States: 2006 -2008, 17
AM. CMTY. SURVEY RPT. 15 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).
15
See, e.g., Keith S. Goldfeld et al., Medicare Expenditures Among Nursing
Home Residents With Advanced Dementia, 171 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 824, 827 (2011).
16
Kate A. Stewart et al., Annual Expenditures for Nursing Home Care: Private
and Public Payer Price Growth, 1977 to 2004, 47 MED. CARE 295, 295–301 (2009); Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE DATA, available at
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/index.html?redirect=/NationalHealthExpendData/
(last
visited Mar. 6, 2013).
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increase at a faster rate than ‘all health care expenditures, Medicare,
Medicaid, and the national Gross Domestic Product.’”17
B. Medical Decision Making and Care for Nursing Home Residents
The legal environment surrounding medical decision making in the
United States for individuals with advanced, irreversible illness has been
evolving—not always in linear fashion18—since the 1976 Karen Anne
Quinlan case19 brought the matter clearly into the public consciousness.20
The present complex legal environment is largely a product of statutes
enacted by Congress and individual state legislatures, particularly regarding
ADs. However, statutes must be consistent with principles contained in the
federal and various state constitutions.21 These foundational documents (as
their provisions may be interpreted and applied by the courts to concrete fact
situations) are Americans’ primary source of individual rights, as well as the
primary constraint on governmental power regarding medical decision
making.22
The 1990 case involving Nancy Cruzan23 is the United States
Supreme Court decision that decided the issue of discontinuing lifeprolonging medical treatment for a particular person.24 Ms. Cruzan was an
automobile accident victim who was kept alive in a permanent vegetative
state within a government (state of Missouri) long-term care facility, through
the use of feeding and hydration tubes. Her parents asked that this
intervention be discontinued, a request they believed was consistent with the
17

Alexander N. Daskalakis, Public Options: The Need for Long-Term Care, Its
Costs, and Government’s Attempts to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
181, 186 (2011).
18
See LOIS SHEPHERD, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS TO ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH
DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 35–36 (2009) (describing the disruptive impact of the
controversy surrounding the dying of Terri Schiavo).
19
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
20
See, e.g., Phillip Kim, Navigating the Maze of End-of-Life Decisions Regarding
the Rejection of Life-Sustaining Treatment, Medical Futility, Physician-Assisted Death, and
Abortion, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 127 (2010).
21
Despite recent insinuations by President Obama to the contrary, the courts still
possess the authority to invalidate legislation that conflicts with the federal and state
constitutions. See Carrie B. Brown & Jennifer Epstein, Obama, the Left Take on the Supreme
(Apr.
3,
2012),
available
at
Court,
POLITICO
www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74759.html; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
22
See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Justice O’Connor and the “Right to Die”:
Constitutional Promises Unfulfilled, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821 (2006); Jack Tuholske,
Going With the Flow: The Montana Court’s Conservative Approach to Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 MONT. L. REV. 237 (2011) (discussing state constitutions as a source of
individual rights to make medical decisions).
23
Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
24
Cf. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 734–36 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 807-09 (1997) (rejecting a right under the U.S. Constitution to physicianassisted death). This was a different question than was presented to the Court in Cruzan.
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patient’s previously expressed (although not formally documented) wishes.
The attending physicians refused to honor this request, and the Missouri
Supreme Court denied the parents’ request to discontinue treatment.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that a mentally
capable adult has a fundamental federal constitutional right, under the liberty
guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause,25 to make
personal medical decisions (even regarding refusal of artificial feeding and
hydration) when death is expected to ensue shortly after the refusal. For
patients with insufficient cognitive and emotional ability, however, the court
ruled that the state’s legitimate interest in preserving life is strong enough to
permit the state, if it so chooses, to require “clear and convincing”
evidence—prior to following a surrogate’s discontinuation instructions—that
the patient would want that treatment withdrawn if the patient were currently
able to make and express an autonomous choice.26 Ordinarily, a written
declaration made by the patient while the patient was still cognitively and
emotionally capable would provide sufficient evidence of the patient’s
treatment preference in the event of subsequent incapacity. Under the Cruzan
decision, states also are free to set lower standards of proof than “clear and
convincing” evidence for incapacitated patients, namely proof by a
preponderance of the evidence (i.e., greater than a 50% likelihood), but not
many states have chosen to avail themselves of this opportunity.27
One form of treatment limitation around which there is by now
substantial agreement is the Do-Not-Resuscitate order (DNR), also known as
a Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation order (DNAR) or No Code order, which
instructs caregivers not to initiate cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for a
patient who suffers a foreseeable cardiac arrest. There have been very few
reported legal decisions directly regarding this topic.28 Nonetheless, the
prevailing rule is that a patient capable of making decisions has the right to

25

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
27
See, e.g., Bernadette Tuthill, Want to Terminate Life Support? Not in New
York—Time to Give New Yorkers a Choice, 26 TOURO L. REV. 675 (2010) (explaining that the
state of New York requires clear and convincing evidence before authorizing surrogates to
withdraw medical treatment from a decisionally-incapacitated patient).
28
Nicole M. Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life—A
Cause of Action That Has Not Gained Traction Even Though a Physician Has Disregarded a
“Do Not Resuscitate” Order, 30 TEMP. J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 221 (2011); Guardado v.
Valley Medical Ctr., 2012 WL 1501271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (denying summary judgment
in a lawsuit seeking to impose liability for failure to resuscitate); Jones v. Ruston La. Hosp.,
46,356–CW, 46,202–CW (La. App. 2 Cir. Aug. 10, 2011), 71 So. 3d 1154 (2011) (suit to
impose liability for hospital’s failure to honor patient’s DNR order); Betancourt v. Trinitas
Hosp., 1 A.3d 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (action to enjoin hospital from
implementing a DNR order rendered moot by the patient’s death); Messenger v. Heos, 2008
WL 5158901 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (claim for legal malpractice brought against attorneys
who failed to pursue plaintiff’s claim against hospital for disobeying a DNR order for the
plaintiff’s infant).
26
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refuse CPR,29 and that surrogates may choose to forego CPR for a patient if
the likely burdens of this intervention to the patient would seriously
outweigh any expected benefits (such as mere continued existence until the
next arrest).30 As with all medical decisions, a DNR order should be written
by the physician only after a thorough consultation with the patient or
surrogate and should be clearly documented in the medical record.31 A DNR
order may be folded easily into a more comprehensive POLST document.32
The most vigorously disputed issue in the treatment limitation arena
is still the status of artificial feeding and hydration.33 The courts have been
unanimous in holding that artificial feeding tubes (of all kinds) are merely
another form of medical intervention that may be withheld or withdrawn
under the same circumstances that would justify withholding or withdrawal
of any other type of medical intervention such as a respirator, dialysis, or
antibiotic use.34 Major medical professional groups endorse this position.35
The contrary position is that feeding and hydration, even when they can be
achieved only through tubes surgically or forcibly inserted into the patient’s
body, are fundamentally different and more morally elemental than medical
treatment, and therefore they should be maintained as long as they might
keep the patient alive (that is, as long as they are not physiologically futile
gestures).36 A number of state legislatures reflect this position in their living
will or durable power of attorney statutes (discussed below), which are
intended to severely constrain the rights of patients and surrogate decision

29

Jeffrey P. Burns et al., Do Not Resuscitate Orders After 25 Years, 31 CRITICAL
CARE MED. 1543 (2003).
30
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 5 (1993).
31
Dan M. Westphal & Stefanie A. McKee, End-of-Life Decision Making in the
Intensive Care Unit: Physician and Nurse Perspectives, 24 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 222 (2009).
But see Wendy G. Anderson et al., Code Status Discussions Between Attending Hospitalist
Physicians and Medical Patients at Hospital Admission, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 359
(2011) (documenting that code status is not discussed by physicians with many seriously ill
patients); J.A. DePalma et al., “Slow” Code: Perspectives of a Physician and Critical Care
Nurse, 22 CRITICAL CARE NURS. Q. 89 (1999) (discussing the previous common practice of
“slow” codes or “show” codes).
32
See infra Part III (discussing the POLST paradigm).
33
Jeannette Y. Wick & Guido R. Zanny, Removing the Feeding Tube: A
Procedure With a Contentious Past, 24 CONSULTANT PHARMACIST 874, 874–76 (2009)
(describing the national debate surrounding the removal of artificial nutrition/hydration in the
cases of Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Schiavo).
34
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
35
Robert D. Truog et al., Recommendations for End-of-Life Care in the Intensive
Care Unit: A Consensus Statement by the American Academy of Critical Care Medicine, 36
CRITICAL CARE MED. 953 (2008).
36
See, e.g., Melanie Evans, Moral Obligations: Catholic Officials Differ Over
Vatican Feeding-Tube Rules, 37 MODERN HEALTHCARE 17, 17 (2007) (explaining the
Vatican’s position on artificial nutrition and hydration, which states “[t]he administration of
food and water even by artificial means is, in principle and ordinary and proportionate means
of preserving life.”).
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makers to authorize the removal of feeding tubes.37 Both the wisdom and the
constitutionality of these purported restrictions are extremely questionable.38
The federal Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) went into effect
in 1991.39 The PSDA mandates that all nursing homes—as well as all
hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, health maintenance organizations,
and preferred provider organizations—participating in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs engage in the following actions at the time a person is
initially admitted or enrolled: (a) provide written information to individuals
about their right to make their own medical decisions to the extent
guaranteed by applicable state law, and make available to them the facility or
organizational policy for effectuating that right for the facility’s or
organization’s patients; (b) ask patients whether they have completed an AD
already and, if the response is in the affirmative, have a system for recording
the patient’s AD; (c) offer currently capable individuals a chance to execute
an AD if they have not previously done so; (d) not discriminate in the
provision of care based on the presence or absence of an AD; (e) create a
system to assure compliance with relevant state laws on medical decision
making; and (f) educate institutional or organizational staff and the
community about patients’ rights pertaining to medical decision making.40
When the patient or surrogate refuses aggressive, technologically
intensive medical interventions, the physician nonetheless has the legal
obligation to offer basic palliative (comfort, pain control, and emotional
support) and hygiene measures.41 Failure to do so could constitute negligence
or form the basis for professional discipline.42 Good palliative care may
sometimes include the practice of palliative sedation to unconsciousness
(also called total, terminal, or controlled sedation) for distress or suffering
during the dying process that cannot otherwise be treated satisfactorily.43
37

Tuthill, supra note 27, at 694.
Kathryn L. Tucker, The Campaign to Deny Terminally Ill Patients Information
and Choices at the End of Life, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 495 (2009).
39
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. IV, §§
4206, 4751 (1990); see, e.g., LAWRENCE P. ULRICH, THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:
MEETING THE CHALLENGES IN PATIENT CARE (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Kevin Wildes
eds., Georgetown University Press 1999).
40
Critiques of the effectiveness of the PSDA in practice are numerous. See, e.g.,
Catherine J. Jones, Say What? How the Patient Self-Determination Act Leaves the Elderly
With Limited English Proficiency Out in the Cold, 13 ELDER L.J. 489 (2005); United States
General Accounting Office, Patient Self-Determination Act: Providers Offer Information on
Advance Directives but Effectiveness Uncertain (Aug. 1995).
41
See Sara L. Imhof & Brian Kaskie, Promoting a “Good Death”: Determinants
of Pain-Management Policies in the United States, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 907 (2008).
42
See Timothy McIntire, Ouch! That Really Hurts. Pain Management in the
Elderly and Terminally Ill: Is This a Legal or a Medical Problem? 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 151
(2003).
43
Thaddeus M. Pope & Lindsey E. Anderson, Voluntarily Stopping Eating and
Drinking: A Legal Treatment Option at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 363, 378–80
(2011); George P. Smith, II, Refractory Pain, Existential Suffering, and Palliative Care:
Releasing an Unbearable Lightness of Being, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 469, 510–12
38
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In every state, it is a criminal offense (as a form of homicide) for a
physician to engage in positive or affirmative actions that are intended to
speed up a patient’s death (such as administering a lethal injection), even if a
competent patient voluntarily requests such action.44 Similarly, in every state
except Oregon,45 Washington,46 Vermont,47 (and possibly Montana),48 it is
criminal for a physician to go along with a patient’s request that the
physician supply the patient with the means to hurry up his or her own death
(such as writing a prescription for a lethal dose of a medication, knowing
very well that the patient intends to commit suicide by taking that lethal
dose).49 The Supreme Court has unanimously rejected the assertion that
individuals have a federal constitutional right to obtain physician-assisted
death (PAD).50
Conversely, a patient, or more usually the patient’s family, may
insist on initiating or continuing medical treatment (“doing everything
possible”) that the clinician believes is futile in terms of patient benefit.
Neither a patient nor a family (nor any other surrogate) possesses a legal
right to demand, nor does a physician owe an enforceable duty to provide,
nonbeneficial medical treatment.51 On the rare occasions when courts have
become involved prospectively with the futility issue, the judicial opinions
generally have been confusing, inconsistent, and poorly reasoned. However,
most courts do not hold a provider liable after the fact for failure to begin or
perpetuate futile interventions for a critically ill patient, even when the
family was insisting on doing everything technologically possible.52 In
(2011) (citing the position statement of the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative
Medicine); Richard A. Mularski et al., Pain Management Within the Palliative and End-ofLife Care Experience in the ICU, 135 CHEST 1360 (2009); Norman L. Cantor, On Hastening
Death Without Violating Legal and Moral Prohibitions, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 407, 418–22
(2006).
44
Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie Difonzo, Stopping for Death: Re-framing Our
Perspective on the End of Life, 20 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2009).
45
Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800 TO .-127
(West).
46
Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.245.901 to
.-70.245 (West 2012).
47
VT. STAT. § 5283 (West 2012).
48
Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
49
Cyndi Bollman, A Dignified Death? Don’t Forget About the Physically
Disabled and Those Not Terminally Ill: An Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide Laws, 34
S. ILL. U. L.J. 395, 399–400 (2010).
50
Washington, 521 U.S. at 702; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 793.
51
Norman L. Cantor, No Ethical or Legal Imperative to Provide Life Support to a
Permanently Unaware Patient, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 58 (2010); Robert D. Truog, Medical
Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2008–09); Mary Whitmer et al., Medical Futility: A
Paradigm as Old as Hippocrates, 28 DIMENSIONS CRIT. CARE NURS. 67 (2009).
52
Thaddeus M. Pope, Involuntary Passive Euthanasia in U.S. Courts:
Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 229,
230 (2008) (arguing that “courts have generally neither prohibited nor punished the unilateral
refusal of LSMT. Providers have regularly obtained both ex ante permission and ex post
forgiveness for stopping LSMT without consent.”).
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practice, clinicians usually seem to take the path of least resistance in such
circumstances and “treat the family,” often out of misapprehension about
potential liability exposure.53 In the vast majority of cases, better physicianfamily communication (often assisted by the involvement of an institutional
ethics committee), in which the realistic (that is, the negative) implications of
“doing everything possible” are clearly delineated, can avoid or resolve
serious disagreement over how best to proceed.54
Over the past four decades, a lot of attention has been concentrated
on advance or prospective health care planning as a mechanism for
individuals to maintain a degree of control over their future medical
treatment even if, at some point, they become physically or mentally
incapable of making and expressing important decisions about their own
care.55 Advocates of advance care planning also suggest that it may help
people and their families avoid unwanted court involvement in medical
treatment decisions,56 diminish the emotional or psychological stress on
family and friends that occurs in difficult crisis circumstances,57 and
conserve limited health care resources in a manner consistent with patient
autonomy or self-determination.58
Two chief types of advance directive legal mechanisms (ADs) are
available for use in prospective health care planning. Statutes explicitly
authorizing individuals to execute ADs have been enacted in every state;
many of these state statutes (sometimes called “natural death acts”) are
modeled on the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act adopted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.59 In some other
Western countries, such as England, the medical and legal establishments
53
Thaddeus M. Pope, Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly Viable, But Limited,
Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183, 186–87
(2010) (“Physicians are overwhelmingly reluctant to withhold or withdraw treatment without
the consent of the authorized decision maker. Accordingly, without explicit permission to do
otherwise, physicians generally comply with surrogate requests for treatment even when they
think it is cruel and wrong.”).
54
Id., at 205; Thaddeus M. Pope, Physicians and Safe Harbor Legal Immunity,
21 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 121, 132 (“Fortunately, most futility disputes are resolved
consensually and informally. Only rarely do they become intractable.”) Cf. Nancy N. Dubler,
A “Principled Resolution”: The Fulcrum for Bioethics Mediation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
177 (2011) (describing the mediation of difficult bioethical disputes among family members
and between them and health care providers).
55
See, e.g., Rebecca C. Morgan, The New Importance of Advance Directives, 2
EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 1 (2009).
56
See David M. Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away from Courts After
Thirty Years of Failure: Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life
Disputes, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 103 (2008).
57
Id. at 2, 224 P.3d 1211 (“It is unlikely that a patient wants family members
fighting over decisions regarding end of life treatment or wants special interests and
government officials interceding in the determination and exercise of the patient’s wishes.”).
58
Lauren H. Nicholas et al., Regional Variation in the Association Between
Advance Directives and End-of-Life Medicare Expenditures, 306 JAMA 1447 (2011).
59
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (1993).
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have broadly accepted ADs,60 although acceptance of the AD model has not
been universally endorsed.61
One legal advance planning mechanism is the proxy directive,
usually a durable power of attorney (DPOA) for health care. The proxy
directive is an AD that enables an individual to voluntarily designate another
person—called a health care agent, surrogate, proxy, or attorney-in-fact—to
make health care decisions in the event that the principal (the individual who
has delegated away decision-making authority) subsequently loses decisionmaking capacity. Many states have enacted statutes that designate a legal
hierarchy of family members and other persons who may make decisions on
behalf of patients incapacitated to make decisions when no guardian has been
appointed or instruction directive (discussed below) has been written;62 in
those jurisdictions, a DPOA may clarify which person has the authority to
decide when two persons otherwise would have equal status (for example,
the patient’s multiple adult siblings) within the hierarchy. Additionally, a
DPOA is valuable when a person prefers to name a non-relative as the future
decision maker. For instance, it is fairly common in the gay community for
individuals to appoint domestic partners or friends, rather than family
members, to act as their health care agents.63
Unlike the situation created with an ordinary power of attorney, the
authority of an agent under a DPOA is not automatically ended when the
principal subsequently becomes incapacitated to make a decision. The
agent’s decision making authority may become effective immediately (an
immediate DPOA) upon execution of the document or it may “spring” into
action when a specifically-delineated event (such as “when my physician
certifies that I am unable to make my own medical decisions”) has taken
place. The DPOA would then endure beyond that triggering event. The
principal may terminate or revoke the arrangement at any time, so long as the
principal remains mentally competent to do so.
One limitation of the DPOA device is the legal and practical
requirement that the principal, or person who would like to delegate certain
decision making authority to an agent, actually have available a suitable,
60

See, e.g., Samantha Halliday, Advance Decisions and the Mental Capacity Act,
18 BRIT. J. NURS. 697 (2009); Catherine J. Bond & Karen Lowton, Geriatricians’ Views of
Advance Decisions and Their Use in Clinical Care in England: Qualitative Study, 40 AGE &
AGEING 450 (2011); Tom Goffin, Advance Directives as an Instrument in an Ageing Europe,
19 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 121 (2012).
61
See, e.g., Werner Gruber, Life and Death on Your Terms: The Advance
Directives Dilemma and What Should Be Done in the Wake of the Schiavo Care, 15 ELDER
L.J. 503, 525–27 (2007) (describing the rejection of the living will model in Japan).
62
See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/25(a)(1) (West 2013) (providing, in
order of priority, a list of family members and “close friend[s]” who may make decisions on
behalf of an incapacitated patient who has not designated a “health care agent”).
63
Annick Persinger, Still Pioneers: Special Social and Economic Hardships for
Elderly Gays and Lesbians, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 137, 151–52 (2010); Matthew T.
Moore, Long-Term Plans for LGBT Floridians: Special Concerns and Suggestions to Avoid
Legal and Family Interference, 34 NOVA L. REV. 255, 272 (2009).
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willing, and able person to whom to delegate that authority. The DPOA does
not help people (the “unbefriended” population) who do not have someone
else whom they can trust to make future personal decisions for them.64
By contrast, an instruction (living will)-type AD documents an
individual’s desires about wanted, limited, or unwanted life-sustaining
medical treatments (LSMTs) in case the person at some point becomes
cognitively or emotionally incapacitated or is unable to communicate
treatment wishes at all. These instructions may be detailed (in the sense of
relating to specific medical treatments in particular clinical situations),
general (such as “no extraordinary or heroic measures”), or phrased in terms
of a patient’s personal values (like “[k]eep me alive forever regardless of
pain or expense” or “[j]ust don’t let me suffer”).65
Proxy directives and instruction directives are not mutually
exclusive. Some AD documents combine the instruction and proxy elements.
Only a presently capable person may execute a valid AD. The AD becomes
effective only when the person creating the AD subsequently lacks
decisional capacity concerning a particular medical treatment question to be
decided; if the patient currently possesses sufficient decisional capacity,66
there is neither a need nor a right for health care providers to defer instead to
an AD for advice.
Courts and state legislatures have consistently made it clear that AD
statutes are not intended to be the exclusive means by which patients may
exercise the right to make future decisions about medical treatment.67 For
example, a patient might convey concerns regarding future medical treatment
orally to the physician during an office visit, with the physician documenting
the patient’s words in the medical chart.68 When that person subsequently
64

Naomi Karp & Erica Wood, Incapacitated and Alone: Health Care Decision
Making for Unbefriended Older People, HUMAN RTS. MAG. (2004), available at
www.abanet.org/irr/hr/spring04/incapacitated.html (describing the challenges associated with
medical decision-making in the context of incapacitated, “unbefriended” patients).
65
See, e.g., NORMAN L. CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF
DEATH WITH DIGNITY 54–71 (1993); Aging With Dignity, Five Wishes, available at
http://www.agingwithdignity.org/five-wishes.php/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
66
See Karin T. Kirchhoff et al., Effect of a Disease-Specific Advance Care
Planning Intervention on End-of-Life Care, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 946 (2012) (reporting
on a study finding that a majority of patients with congestive heart failure or end-stage renal
disease continued to make their own decisions about care until the end of their lives).
67
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.106 (West 2012):
The provisions of this chapter [Fla. Stat. § 765, authorizing individuals to
execute ADs] are cumulative to the existing law regarding an individual’s
right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment and do not
impair any existing rights or responsibilities which a health care provider,
a patient, including a minor, competent or incompetent person, or a
patient’s family may have under the common law, Federal Constitution,
State Constitution, or statutes of this state.
See also, e.g., Stouffer v. Reid, 993 A.2d 104 (Md. 2010) (finding that competent adults have
a constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical intervention).
68
E.g., TENN. CODE ANNOT. § 68-11-1806(a).
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becomes unable to make personal medical decisions, his or her oral
instructions are just as legally valid as would be a written document executed
in compliance with all of the formalities contained in the state’s AD statute.
Nonetheless, even though a legally valid AD may be oral, the patient’s
treatment wishes are much more likely to be followed by the health care
system if they are enshrined in a written document.69
C. Problems With Advance Directives
There are a myriad of serious problems with the legal status quo and
the prevalent clinical practice that the legal climate helps to engender
regarding the medical care of individuals with advanced, irreversible illness
in the United States. There is a significant body of evidence that has been
accumulated showing, too often, patients’ previously stated wishes
concerning LSMT are not respected and implemented by health care
providers, and very often also are not respected and implemented by families
who are supposed to be acting as the patient’s surrogate. Individuals with
advanced, irreversible illness frequently receive more aggressive medical
treatment than they had earlier said they would want.70 These problems
frequently specifically impact nursing home residents, their families, and
their professional caregivers in negative ways, creating or exacerbating an
unfortunate chasm between the values and wishes of the resident on one
hand, and the actual care provided to that resident on the other.
The primary problems discussed in this section are: nursing home
residents without ADs; disagreements concerning the interpretation and
application of AD instructions; nursing home residents whose ADs do not
follow them when they are transferred to a hospital, another nursing home, or
a home- or community-based setting; and inadequate mechanisms to assure
health care provider compliance with nursing home residents’ ADs.
1. Residents Without Directives
Despite substantial public attention, deep-seated psychological
resistance to the contemplation of illness and death, coupled with inertia and
legal complexities71 complicating the execution of an AD, keeps the rate of

69

See, e.g., Erin Webley, Law, Insouciance, and Death in the Emergency Room,
19 ELDER L.J. 257, 260 (2011) (describing personnel in the hospital emergency department
ignoring the patient’s oral directive to withhold life-prolonging medical intervention).
70
Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
34 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 30, 36–37 (2004).
71
See generally Lesley S. Castillo et al., Lost in Translation: The Unintended
Consequences of Advance Directive Law on Clinical Care, 154 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 121
(2011).
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AD completion discouragingly low among members of the general public.72
Personal characteristics may influence AD completion rates among members
of different population groups.73 Most critically ill patients have failed to
formally designate a surrogate decision maker or express (let alone
document) their preferences regarding life-sustaining medical treatments.74
Nursing home residents are considerably more likely to complete an
AD than community-dwelling older persons,75 no doubt in large part because
the time of admission to a nursing home is a very teachable moment when
the entering resident’s mind is keenly focused on the medical future.
Nevertheless, the AD completion rate in nursing homes is still far less than
perfect.76 The PSDA, while mandating at least some semblance of an
advance planning inquiry, expressly forbids any health care provider from
requiring a patient/resident to execute an AD as a condition of admission or
receiving services77 and some residents choose not to take advantage of the
AD opportunity. Additionally, a significant proportion of people who enter
nursing homes are already seriously mentally compromised at the time of
admission,78 and therefore probably are precluded from executing a valid
legal document such as a medical AD.

72
Gina Bravo et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Interventions to Promote
Advance Directives Among Older Adults: A Systematic Review and Multi-Level Analysis, 67
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1122 (2008).
73
Manjula K. Tamura et al., Preferences for Dialysis Withdrawal and
Engagement in Advance Care Planning Within a Diverse Sample of Dialysis Patients, 25
NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 237, 237 (2010). See also Amy S. Kelley et al.,
Determinants of Death in the Hospital Among Older Adults, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y
2321, 2323–24 (2011) (finding that the black race and Hispanic ethnicity are correlates of inhospital death). But see James F. Lawrence, The Advance Directive Prevalence in Long-Term
Care: A Comparison of Relationships Between a Nurse Practitioner Healthcare Model and a
Traditional Healthcare Model, 21 J. AM. ACAD. NURSE PRAC. 179, 182–83 (2009) (finding
that black people and white people in the Evercare healthcare model, which relies heavily on
the involvement of nurse practitioners, had similar rates of AD completion).
74
Sharon L. Camhi et al., Deciding in the Dark: Advance Directives and
Continuation of Treatment in Chronic Critical Illness, 37 CRITICAL CARE MED. 919 (2009).
75
Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1475 (“The majority (65%) of nursing home
residents have some form of advance directive and 56% have ‘do not resuscitate’ (DNR)
orders.”).
76
Helaine E. Resnick et al., Advance Directives in Nursing Home Residents Aged
> or = 65 Years: United States 2004, 25 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 476, 476
(2008); Adrienne L. Jones et al., Use of Advance Directives in Long-Term Care Populations,
NCHS
Data
Brief
No.
54
1,
3
(2011),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db54.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
77
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(C) (2006).
78
See Kelly L. Moore et al., Age and Sex Variation in Prevalence of Chronic
Medical Conditions in Older Residents of U.S. Nursing Homes, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y
756, 758 (2012) (documenting nursing home prevalence rates for dementia of 45% for men
and 52% for women and for depression of 31% for men and 37% for women).
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2. Interpretation and Application Disagreements
Moreover, even when a jurisdiction’s advance directives law is clear
and the patient has timely executed an instruction directive, health care
providers and surrogates often are unclear about when the living will applies
and are uncomfortable about deciding when a patient is on a dying trajectory
that warrants triggering the declaration’s instructions. Also, health care
providers sometimes find a living will’s instructions either too broad or too
narrow to provide much useful guidance in a specific situation.
Living wills have come under widespread criticism for either
being badly written or not being sufficiently specific.
Considering that many living wills are usually drafted far in
advance of a person actually being ill, one wonders if there
can ever be a sufficient degree of precision regarding the
circumstances meant to be addressed. Complications arise
when a living will is written in a manner that allows for
multiple interpretations. . . . [S]uch unclear language may
require interpretation from medical professionals and family
members who may disagree. This becomes problematic
when families or other surrogates ask for treatment that
would not have been desired by the patient and/or is
medically futile.79
The ideal function of an instruction directive is to facilitate a meeting
of the minds between the ill person and the health care team. However,
misunderstandings about a directive’s true intent may be exacerbated by the
reluctance of many physicians to engage patients in meaningful discussions
about medical care goals and preferences in a timely manner.80
3. Document Portability Problems
Frequently, individuals with advanced, irreversible illness move over
time from one health care or residential setting to another as their health and
other circumstances constantly change. Hospitalized or community-dwelling
79
Carolyn Standley & Bryan A. Liang, Addressing Inappropriate Care Provision
at the End-of-Life: A Policy Proposal for Hospitals, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 137, 147
(2010). See also Donna A. Casey & David M. Walker, The Clinical Realities of Advance
Directives, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 429, 439–40 (2011) (using a clinical vignette to illustrate the
problems of interpreting and applying an AD to a specific set of facts).
80
Jennifer W. Mack et al., End-of-Life Care Discussions Among Patients With
Advanced Cancer, 156 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 204, 207–09 (2012); Dorothy D. Nachman,
Living Wills: Is It Time to Pull the Plug?, 18 ELDER L.J. 289, 292 (2011) (“The goal in end-oflife planning should be to encourage an open and honest conversation among the individual,
his or her health care providers, and health care agent about the patient’s desires at end of
life.”).
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people may be admitted to nursing homes,81 and nursing home residents may
be transferred—temporarily or until death occurs—to acute care hospitals82
(generally through the emergency department)83 or other facilities as an
individual’s provider-perceived84 needs appear to dictate. Financial
incentives also play a role in encouraging hospital to nursing home
transfers.85 Nursing home residents and their surrogates relatively rarely
refuse such transfers when they are requested by attending physicians.86 The
“patterns of transitions between nursing facilities, hospitals, and homes”
have been described as “dynamic . . . , complex, interdependent, [and]
longitudinal.”87
Decisions about the initiation, continuation, withholding, or
withdrawal of specific medical interventions may need to be made by
physicians and other caregivers working within the facilities or home
environments to which nursing home residents may be transferred. These
decisions are not aided by ADs—even if the ADs are beautifully drafted—
when the documents do not physically (or electronically) follow the
individual among different settings, and that therefore are not known and
available to personnel in the transferee facilities or home settings in a timely
manner. In theory, ADs are intended to be patient-specific rather than placespecific, but in practice they often become lost or forgotten when the
individual is transferred to a different setting from the nursing home or back
to the nursing home from an alternative setting.

81

See Emily R. Smith & Alan B. Stevens, Predictors of Discharges to a Nursing
Home in a Hospital-Based Cohort, 10 J. AM. MED. DIR. ASS’N 623 (2009).
82
Masayo Sato et al., Residential and Health Care Transition Patterns Among
Older Medicare Beneficiaries Over Time, 51 GERONTOLOGIST 170 (2011) (finding the most
frequent transition pattern was transfer to the hospital and back to the nursing home); David
C. Grabowski et al., Predictors of Nursing Home Hospitalization: A Review of the Literature,
65 MED. CARE RES. REV. 3 (2008).
83
Caroline E. Stephens et al., Emergency Department Use by Nursing Home
Residents: Effect of Severity of Cognitive Impairment, 52 GERONTOLOGIST 383 (2012).
84
Many of these transfers are criticized as unnecessary or inappropriate. See, e.g.,
Jane L. Givens et al., Hospital Transfers of Nursing Home Residents With Advanced
Dementia, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 905 (2012) (finding that the majority of
hospitalizations of nursing home residents with dementia are due to infections that could have
been treated competently in the nursing home and that tube feeding complications account for
almost half of all emergency department visits by nursing home residents when the tube
feedings were questionable in the first place).
85
Muriel R. Gillick, How Medicare Shapes the Way We Die, 8 J. HEALTH &
BIOMED. L. 27, 52 (2012).
86
Susan L. Mitchell et al., Decisions to Forgo Hospitalization in Advanced
Dementia: A Nationwide Study, 55 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 432 (2007).
87
Christopher M. Callahan et al., Transitions in Care for Older Adults With and
Without Dementia,” 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 813, 817 (2012).
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4. Enforcement Shortcomings
State AD statutes specifically excuse a health care provider who
decides, for reasons of personal conscience, not to carry out the explicitly
stated treatment preferences of a patient or surrogate, so long as that provider
does not impede efforts to have the patient transferred to the care of a
different provider who is willing to respect the patient’s AD.88 These statutes
embody a strong public policy interest in protecting the physician’s right of
personal conscience,89 and are consistent with Section 7(E) of the Uniform
Health Care Decisions Act,90 although they have inspired complaints that
“advance directive statutes meant to protect patients’ right of selfdetermination may instead better protect physicians from punitive action.”91
In the same vein, courts have declined to hold health care providers liable for
failure to follow a patient’s or surrogate’s instructions to withdraw or
withhold particular forms of treatment,92 often on the grounds that providing
life-prolonging intervention can never cause the sort of cognizable injury or
harm for which the tort system is designed to provide monetary
compensation.93 These conscience-based statutes and judicial decisions
would apply with full force in the nursing home context.
Physician noncompliance with patient wishes to limit medical
interventions that have been expressed in ADs sometimes happens,94
especially when physician anxiety (ordinarily ungrounded but sincere) about
potential negative legal repercussions takes over the situation.95 Those
88

E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.06 (West 2012).
See generally Don R. Castleman, Conflict of Conscience: Refusal of a Health
Care Provider to Withdraw Life Support, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 175, 191 (2011);
Peter D. Jacobson & Soniya K. Mathur, Health Law 2010 : It’s Not All About the Money, 36
AM. J. L. & MED. 389, 398 (2010); Stephen Wear & Susan Lagaipa, Toleration of Moral
Diversity and the Conscientious Refusal of Physicians to Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment,
19 J. MED. & PHIL. 147, 153 (1994).
90
See 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 83 (2006).
91
Castillo et al., supra note 71, at 125.
92
E.g., Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr. (Bartling II), 229 Cal. Rptr. 360
(Ct. App. 1986); Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., Inc., 988 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008). But see Thaddeus M. Pope, Nonconsensual Provision of Life-Sustaining
Treatment: Civil, Criminal, and Disciplinary Sanctions, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. (In
Press 2013).
93
Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009);
Saitta, supra note 28.
94
See Nachman, supra note 80, at 303 (“While physicians generally view the use
of advance directives positively, their professional actions indicate some reluctance to fully
respect the decisions of patients regarding their end-of-life care decision making. Frequently
patients’ or surrogates’ wishes are merely one factor considered by physicians in making
treatment decisions at the end of life.”). The other side of the coin—individuals and families
who demand medical treatments that the physician believes to be clinically and ethically
futile—has spawned an enormous quantity of literature, a discussion of which is beyond the
scope of the present article.
95
See Casey, supra note 79, at 441 (describing a clinical scenario in which,
contrary to their father’s AD, a patient’s daughters continued to demand dialysis, invasive
89
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anxieties reinforce the general philosophical biases in favor of aggressive
action and against acceptance of the limits of medicine that still animate
much of the modern medical enterprise.96 Entreaties by patient advocates for
judicial recognition of a cause of action for “wrongful living” when an
individual’s treatment wishes as expressed in an AD are not respected by the
care providers have thus far gone unheeded.97
III. THE POLST ALTERNATIVE
A. Background
“The evolution of advance directives has mirrored that of many new
medical technologies: initial unbridled enthusiasm evolved into skepticism
as empirical evidence raised questions about the current practice, followed
by a wiser, more constrained application.”98 Growing frustration with the
inherent limitations of existing instruments for promoting the prospective
autonomy of patients with advanced, irreversible illness who may become
incapacitated to make a decision99 has led many attorneys, health care
providers, and commentators to advocate as the next step in the evolution of
health care advance planning law and policy the use of POLST (Physician
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment) forms.100 From a variety of
perspectives, the POLST paradigm offers a number of opportunities for
going beyond the status quo, including our present strong reliance on ADs, to

catheters, and other aggressive treatments). The authors comment, “The unfortunate result of
this type of conflict is that healthcare professionals give more authority for decision making to
families than to advance directives, mostly out of fear of potential litigation from surviving
family members.” Id.; Nachman, supra note80, at 292 (ascribing the failure of ADs primarily
to the incompatibility of their two distinct goals of “protecting an individual’s right to
determine the nature and scope of their (sic) end-of-life care and protecting health care
professionals from liability”).
96
See Daniel Callahan, End-of-Life Care: A Philosophical or Management
Problem?, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 114, 115 (2011).
97
Holly F. Lynch et al., Compliance With Advance Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED.
133, 139 (2008).
98
Douglas B. White & Robert M. Arnold, The Evolution of Advance Directives,
306 JAMA 1485, 1485 (2011); see also Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution of Health Care
Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211 (2010).
99
But see Benjamin H. Levi & Michael J. Green, Too Soon to Give Up: Reexamining the Value of Advance Directives, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2010) (arguing against the
abandonment of ADs just yet).
100
The exact nomenclature varies among different jurisdictions; some states, for
instance, use the language of MOLST, or Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment.
Patricia Bomba, Landmark Legislation in New York Affirms Benefits of a Two-Step Approach
to Advance Care Planning Including MOLST: A Model of Shared, Informed Medical
Decision-Making and Honoring Patient Preferences for Care at the End of Life, 17 WIDENER
L. REV. 475 (2011).
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potentially improve the care of individuals with advanced, irreversible
illness.101
Unlike a traditional AD executed by a patient while still capable of
making decisions, POLST entails a medical order written by a physician102
(with the concurrence of the patient or surrogate)103 instructing other health
care providers such as emergency medical squads104 about the treatment of a
patient with advanced, irreversible illness under specific factual
circumstances. “The POLST form is a more uniform, comprehensive, and
portable method of documentation of patients’ end-of-life treatment desires.
Although the POLST form is not intended to replace ADs executed by
patients, it corrects many of the inadequacies of current forms and intends to
lessen the discrepancy between a patient’s end-of-life care preferences and
the treatment(s) eventually provided by the patients’ health care
providers.”105
At least sixteen states have formally implemented the POLST
Paradigm, with national coordination efforts being administered through the
Center for Ethics in Health Care at the Oregon Health & Science
University.106 Many more states are in the process of developing and
implementing their own versions of POLST.107
B. Adapting POLST for Nursing Home Residents
Some nursing homes already participate in POLST programs.108
Experience thus far with the use of the POLST approach for nursing home
residents with advanced, irreversible illness indicates that residents for whom
101
See Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing: POLST: Physician
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 23 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 353 (2012); Keith E. Sonderling,
POLST: A Cure for the Common Advance Directive—It’s Just What the Doctor Ordered, 33
NOVA L. REV. 451 (2009).
102
Although this article discusses POLST exclusively as a physician’s order, some
states also permit advanced nurse practitioners and physicians’ assistants to write the order.
See CHARLES P. SABATINO & NAOMI KARP, IMPROVING ADVANCED ILLNESS CARE: THE
EVOLUTION OF STATE POLST PROGRAMS 29–35 (2011).
103
There is variation among jurisdictions regarding whether the patient or
surrogate, in addition to the physician, must sign the POLST form for it to be legally effective.
Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d at 10–11.
104
See Stanley Sam et al., Survey of Emergency Medical Services Professionals’
Experience With Advance Directives and Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 59 J.
AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2383 (2011).
105
Sara Catherine Spillers & Brittany Lamb, Is the POLST Model Desirable for
Florida?, 8 FLA. PUB. HEALTH REV. 80, 82–84 (2011).
106
See generally POLST, www.polst.org (last visited June 27, 2013).
107
See, e.g., FLORIDA POLST, http://med.fsu.edu/medlaw/POLST (last visited
June 27, 2013) (providing materials describing the Florida POLST effort).
108
Helaine E. Resnick et al., Nursing Home Participation in End-of-Life
Programs: United States, 2004, 26 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE 354, 354 (2009)
(finding that, in 2004, 13.3% of surveyed nursing homes were participating in a POLST
program).
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POLSTs have been written are significantly more likely to have care
provided to them that is consistent with their authentic personal values and
wishes.109 This contrasts with the disjuncture between actual and desired
medical interventions often witnessed in the absence of a POLST, even when
the individual has executed an AD. Health care professionals ordinarily are
used to, and reasonably comfortable with, respecting physicians’ orders.
Thus, a POLST is more likely than an AD to be honored by health care
professionals within nursing homes,110 as well as more likely to be honored
across care settings as the individual is transferred from setting to setting
within the continuum of care.111
Because a POLST becomes part of a patient’s medical
record, the form is meant to travel with the patient between
health care facilities. This documentation is helpful in
situations such as emergency care [when a nursing home
transfers a resident to the hospital] when the health care
provider may be unfamiliar with the patient. The POLST
then allows a receiving physician to follow medical orders
regarding the patient’s end-of-life wishes without the need
for repeated questioning regarding life-sustaining
treatment.112
Moreover, nursing home residents for whom POLSTs have been
written are less likely to be transferred out the nursing home to another
health care setting.113 Those residents, therefore, are more likely to ultimately
die in their own familiar, supportive nursing home surrounding, rather than
in a hospital.114 As explained by a commentator:
109
Susan E. Hickman et al., A Comparison of Methods to Communicate Treatment
Preferences in Nursing Facilities: Traditional Practices Versus the Physician Orders for
Life-Sustaining Treatment Program, 58 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1241, 1247 (2010).
110
Susan E. Hickman et al., The Consistency Between Treatments Provided to
Nursing Facility Residents and Orders on the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment
Form, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2091, 2094–97 (2011); Judy L. Meyers et al., Physician
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment Form, 30 J. GERONT. NURS. 37, 43 (2004). But see Karin
T. Kirchhoff et al., Effect of a Disease-Specific Advance Care Planning Intervention on Endof-Life Care, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 946 (2012) (claiming that most patients in this
study either received the care they desired at the end of life or altered their preferences to be in
accord with the care they could receive).
111
See Janet L. Abrahm, Advances in Palliative Medicine and End-of-Life Care,
62 ANN. REV. MED. 187, 196–97 (2011) (promoting POLST as a major advance because of the
document’s portability across different care settings).
112
Kathryn L. Tucker, When Dying Takes Too Long: Activism for Social Change
to Protect and Expand Choice at the End of Life, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 109, 134–35 (2011).
113
See, e.g., Aram Dobalian, Nursing Facility Compliance With Do-NotHospitalize Orders, 44 GERONTOLOGIST 159, 163 (2004) (finding that nursing home residents
with DNH orders were half as likely to be hospitalized as those without such orders).
114
An Vandervoort et al., Advance Directives and Physicians’ Orders in Nursing
Home Residents With Dementia in Flanders, Belgium: Prevalence and Associated Outcomes,
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The hospital is the worst place to put dying people. These
patients are unable to recognize relatives, confined to bed,
and can’t swallow. In the hospital, tubes and machines may
keep them alive for weeks or months. Is this the care and
dignity you want to give your loved one?115
Additionally, POLSTs enable greater precision (and hence, less
ambiguity) in the specification of prospective treatment orders. For example,
according to one commentator:
CPR and the order to forgo it, the DNR order, have taken on
a constellation of important symbolic meanings that are
often different to patients, their families, and the healthcare
team. These disparate meanings can then serve to hijack
discourse about prognosis and the possibility of actual
therapies…and instead encourage an all-or-nothing approach
informed by the hypothetical of future resuscitation.116
Nonetheless, many individuals with DNR orders do, in fact, request
that certain other forms of life-sustaining medical intervention be attempted,
while people who want CPR to be attempted in the event of a
cardiopulmonary arrest usually want less than “everything” to be attempted
for them.117 The POLST provides a mechanism to effectuate those specific
preferences. In a related illustration of the precision possible in a POLST:
The POLST form offers an advantage over traditional donot-hospitalize orders, because it includes orders for
hospitalization when comfort needs cannot be met in the
current care setting and also allows for hospitalization while
opting out of more-aggressive ICU [intensive care unit] care.
Residents with POLST forms [in this study] who desired full

24 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRIC 1133, 1141 (2012) (finding that the chances of dying in a hospital
were lower if there was a General Practitioner’s (GP) order (the European counterpart to the
POLST)); Bernard J. Hammes et al., The POLST Program: A Retrospective Review of the
Demographics of Use and Outcomes in One Community Where Advance Directives Are
Prevalent, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 77, 83 (2012).
115
Carl Hammerschlag, Die With Dignity, 31 CARING 54 (2012).
116
Daniel J. Braunner, Later Than Sooner: A Proposal for Ending the Stigma of
Premature Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 59 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 2366, 2366 (2011).
117
Susan E. Hickman et al., Use of the Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment Program in Oregon Nursing Facilities: Beyond Resuscitation Status, 52 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1424, 1429 (2004); Erik K. Fromme et al., Research Letter: POLST
Registry Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders and Other Patient Treatment Preferences, 307 JAMA 34,
34 (2012) (“Thus, half of patients with DNR orders would want to be transported to the
hospital if indicated, and half would not unless comfort needs could not be met in their current
location.”).
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treatment received the same level of treatment as residents
without POLST forms.118
This opportunity for greater specificity on the POLST form makes it
more probable that the patient’s authentic values and preferences will be
carried out in practice, either in the nursing home or within the hospital or
other setting to which the erstwhile nursing home resident has been
transferred.
Another potentially beneficial facet of the POLST paradigm is
reduction in the emotional stress placed upon the nursing home resident’s
family members and friends in their capacity as proxy or surrogate for the
currently incapacitated individual.119 The presence of a clear POLST reduces
the likelihood that aggressive medical intervention will be initiated or
continued by default because a surrogate feels psychologically bound to ask
for “everything” when the patient’s preferences are not precisely known.120
In the absence of a clear expression of the presently incapacitated
individual’s treatment preferences about future care, made while that person
was still capable of decision-making, there is evidence that surrogates are
rather unreliable predictors or reflectors of what the patient would have
selected for himself or herself.121 By providing a high degree of clarity, based
upon the patient’s timely prior input, a POLST can reduce the discordance
between surrogate and patient decisions and the emotional strain for the
surrogate engendered by the need to make treatment choices largely in the
dark.122
Attempts to implement a successful POLST paradigm program for
nursing home residents face several particular challenges. One challenge
concerns medical care continuity; when an individual is admitted to a nursing
home, frequently that person’s primary care is taken over by a new physician
(who may be under contract as the facility’s Medical Director) because the
physician who had been providing primary care in the community does not
continue his or her caregiving relationship with the resident after nursing

118

Hickman et al., supra note 9, at 1747.
See, e.g., David Wendler & Annette Rid, Systematic Review: The Effect on
Surrogates of Making Treatment Decisions for Others, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336,
343–34 (2011).
120
Ursala K. Braun & Laurence B. McCullough, Preventing Life-Sustaining
Treatment by Default, 9 ANNALS FAM. MED. 250, 254 (2011).
121
See, e.g., Liat Ayalon et al., Preferences for End-of-Life Treatment:
Concordance Between Older Adults With Dementia or Mild Cognitive Impairment and Their
Spouses, 24 INT’L PSYCHOGERIATRICS 1798 (2012).
122
See Brenna Kelly et al., Systematic Review: Individuals’ Goals for Surrogate
Decision-Making, 60 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 884 (2012) (documenting that two of the
primary goals of individuals regarding surrogate decision making during times of decisional
incapacity are being treated consistently with one’s own treatment preferences and reducing
the burden on their families).
119
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home admission has taken place.123 Another set of challenges concerns
physician availability.124 There generally is much less active physician
presence in nursing homes than in acute care hospitals, and time pressure is
the most commonly cited barrier to the conduct of the type of extensive,
thoughtful physician or nursing and resident/family (or other surrogate)
conversations that the POLST paradigm ideally envisions.125
In the circumstance of nursing home residents with advanced,
irreversible illness who are transferred to a hospital or other health care
setting despite the presence of a POLST, the portability of the document—
the POLST physically or electronically accompanying the person in real
time—is a challenge that has been discussed already. Apprehensions about
potential adverse legal repercussions permeating the minds of physicians and
other health care providers is another challenge to enthusiastic POLST
support that was mentioned earlier. These challenges are exacerbated in the
nursing home arena, which is surrounded by an especially complex and
adversarial regulatory and litigation climate.126
One of the most substantial challenges is lack of knowledge about
POLST, its conceptual underpinnings, and the practical details of
implementation, on the part of nursing home personnel.127 Because the
POLST paradigm can and should be integrated significantly into the nursing
home setting, and indeed many POLSTs are initiated in the nursing home,
information and exercises on this subject matter for staff at all levels (since
staff at all levels interact with residents and their families) should regularly
be provided as part of each facility’s in-service continuing education
endeavors.128 For instance, it is important that physicians and other staff
understand how to present the POLST concept to residents and their families
straightforwardly as a voluntary option rather than as a mandatory
requirement.129 At the same time, nursing homes should utilize their resident

See Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1474 (“Most nursing home residents are
cared for by family physicians, general internists, and geriatricians who work part-time in the
nursing home.”); Paul R. Katz et al., Nursing Home Physician Specialists: A Response to the
Workforce Crisis in Long-Term Care, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 411 (2009).
124
Zweig et al., supra note 4, at 1474 (“Physicians are rarely present in the
nursing facility when residents become acutely ill.”); Meyers et al., supra note 110, at 43
(indicating “concerns about physicians’ accessibility for end-of-life discussions”).
125
Anthony J. Caprio et al., Health Care Professionals’ Perceptions and Use of
the Medical Orders for Scope of Treatment (MOST) Form in North Carolina Nursing Homes,
13 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N. 162, 165 (2012).
126
See Marshall B. Kapp, The Liability Environment for Physicians Providing
Nursing Home Medical Care: Does It Make a Difference for Residents?, 16 ELDER L.J. 249,
251–52 (2009).
127
See Caprio, supra note 125, at 162–63.
128
Meyers et al., supra note 110, at 44; Neil S. Wenger et al., Implementation of
Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment in Nursing Homes in California: Evaluation
of a Novel Statewide Dissemination Mechanism, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51 (2012).
129
See Fromm et al., supra note 117, at 34.
123
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councils and family councils130 as structural vehicles to educate their
residents and families about the POLST paradigm option.
Despite a jurisdiction-specific statutory or regulatory overlay, each
institutional nursing home will likely retain substantial discretion about how
POLSTs written by physicians for residents they serve are to be reconciled
and integrated with existing institutional bylaws and protocols regarding the
treatment of persons with advanced, irreversible illness. For example, will
the institutional provider presently caring for a particular resident recognize
and act upon a POLST signed by a physician who earlier cared for that
individual in the community or in another institutional provider, but who
does not have active admitting and treating privileges within the current
provider? Conversely, will the nursing home limit its recognition of POLSTs
to those that are written by physicians who are members of that nursing
home’s medical staff? In a connected vein, even if state law permits nonphysicians to write POLSTs in consultation with patients or their surrogates,
would any particular nursing home elect to recognize and implement a
POLST written by a non-physician?
VI. CONCLUSION
As stated eloquently by one commentator:
[I]f our society fervently believes that self-determination at
the end of life is a hallmark of an evolved society, health
care professionals, attorneys, and legislatures have a duty to
work together to develop a clear and consistent process that
allows clients and patients to choose their end-of-life care
options with the confidence that their choices will satisfy
underlying statutory law and hospital policies while
supporting patient autonomy. By working together,
professionals can understand the complex concerns of the
other and work in tandem to create a reliable process that
lawyers, doctors, and hospitals can accept to support the
dying patient.131
As we engage in innovative, inter-professional collaboration in
pursuing the goal of assuring that individuals with advanced, irreversible
illness receive until the end of their lives the health care most consistent with
their basic values and preferences, promoting and implementing the POLST
paradigm should be prominently on the agenda. Further, those POLSTrelated efforts ought to go beyond the hospital and home-based settings, to
130

See generally Donna R. Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement, 26 J.
LEGAL MED. 9, 30 (2005) (explaining the value of resident and family councils).
131
Nachman, supra note 80, at 293.
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include attention to the important nursing home venue, where many people
who can benefit from POLST will—and should—spend their final days.
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